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ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE: ROMANCING COERCED
CONFESSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The March 26, 1991 United States Supreme Court decision in Ari-
zona v. Fulminante, I applying the harmless error rule to involuntary con-
fessions, has met with unjust criticism. Contrary to these criticisms, the
ramifications of the opinion are not abrogations of due process. Fulmi-
nante is significant as the admission of an involuntary confession will no
longer automatically trigger reversal. Instead, the evidence will be sub-
ject to a stringent test requiring the prosecutor to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the confession was harmless.
2
Criminal defendants who are found guilty by trial often find an er-
ror in the proceedings leading to their conviction. 3 Accordingly, all fifty
states and the United States Congress have enacted harmless error stat-
utes. 4 Such statutes establish the rule that ajudgment shall be sustained
unless there are errors or defects which affect the material rights of the
parties. 5 While a more stringent application of the harmless error rule
applies to errors involving the denial of a federal constitutional right,
the Court, for the first time, extends the rule to coerced confessions.
6
The Rehnquist majority opinion was met by a bitter dissent fromJustice
1. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
2. Id. at 1265.
3. James C. Scoville, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 740 (1987) [hereinafter Scoville].
4. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
5. The current harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988), incorporates the
harmless error statute enacted in 1919, Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181,
which provided that a judgment was to be affirmed "without regard to technical errors,
defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." However,
the original statute was repealed in 1948 and replaced a year later by a version in which the
term "technical" was deleted, 63 Stat. 105 (1949). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(A) modeled
after the Act of 1919, which provides, "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights shall be disregarded." See also FED. R. Civ. P. 61 and
FED. R. EvID. 103(A).
Although it appears that repeal and reenactment resulted from confusion over
whether FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(A) and FED. R. Civ. P. 61 made § 391 redundant, 11 CHARLES
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2881 (1973), the re-
sult is that § 2111 may be coextensive with Chapman. See United States v. Hastings, 461
U.S. 499 (1983) and ROGER TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 41-43 (1970).
6. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). For a short history of harmless error
rules see Phillip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1969) [hereinafter Mause]; Vilija Bilaisis, Comment, Harmless
Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 459-60 (1983);
Nolan E. Clark, Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967); Note, Harm-
less Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814 (1970).
For a discussion on the differences between constitutional and nonconstitutional
harmless error rules, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); Steven H.
Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421,422-
23 (history of nonconstitutional harmless error rules).
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Byron R. White7 and with much reproach from commentators8 accusing
the majority of deserting the privilege against self-incrimination. 9 How-
ever, Fulminante upholds the ban on admissions of coerced confessions
into evidence and does not threaten resolution of the constitutional
guarantees. The result is that no conviction will be affirmed if there is
any reasonable doubt that it is based on the involuntary confession.
This Comment analyzes the Court's decision to apply the harmless
error rule to the erroneous admission at a jury trial of involuntary con-
fessions. 10 It specifically discusses how the Court balances society's in-
terest in convicting the guilty with a defendant's interest in avoiding an
unjust conviction. The Comment also examines the historical develop-
ment of the constitutional harmless error doctrine and the future impli-
cations of the decision. Further, it will attempt to reconcile with the
Rehnquist majority, the Court's critics who claim that a threat to the
defendant's constitutional right to due process looms on the horizon.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Common Law
Traditionally, the Court has found the erroneous admission of a co-
erced confession" at trial can never be considered harmless. 12 This
traditional exclusion of coerced confessions from the harmless error
doctrine reflects the attitude imbedded in American and English juris-
prudence.' 3 Originally, an error in a criminal trial proceeding led to
reversal regardless of whether the error affected the outcome. 14 The
federal courts rationalized there was a "stringent presumption of preju-
7. The Supreme Court, Justice White, held that: (1) defendant's confession was co-
erced; and (2) error in admission of the confession was not harmless; and, per CJ. Rehn-
quist, held that; (3) harmless error rule applied to admission of involuntary confessions.
8. The Supreme Court's Harmful Error, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at A22; Alan Ellis,
Time to Draw the Line on Police Power, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 29, 1991, at A27; A Supreme Court
Retreat, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1991, at A20; Editorial: Supreme Court Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE
(City Edition), Mar. 29, 1991, at 47; Opening the Door to Police Abuse, CM. TRIB., Mar. 28,
1991, at C22; Who s Activist Now? Conservative Justices Rewrite Criminal Rights, SEAT.E TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1991, at A10; Todd Spangler, Delegates Clear Bill to Make Coerced Confessions Useless,
WASH. TIMES, April 5, 1991, at B4 (judiciary committee chairman of the House of Dele-
gates in Maryland, John Arnick, is pushing a House bill in Maryland which says that no
conviction may stand in a case where a coerced confession was introduced).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law ...."
10. Supreme Court cases have used the terms "coerced confession" and "involuntary
confession" interchangeably. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
11. For the Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning of "coerced," see Colo-
rado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986).
12. In Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), the Court held that a conviction must
be reversed when a coerced confession is introduced into evidence. Id. at 568.
13. For a complete discussion of the English heritage and American modification of
the harmless error rule, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 26.6 (1985).
14. See James Duke Cameron & Jones Osborn II, When Harmless Error Isn't Harmless,
1971 LAw & Soc. ORD. 23 (1971); Scoville, supra note 3; Robert Pondolfi, Comment, Prin-
ciplesforApplication of the Harmless Error Standard, 41 U. CMI. L. REV. 616, 617 (1974) [herein-
after Pondolfi]. For a complete discussion of harmless error, see ROGER TRAYNOR, THE
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dice" from a trial error.1 5 As retrials increased, the rule of automatic
reversal was widely criticized as a waste of judicial resources
16 and re-
viewing courts were condemned as "impregnable citadels of technical-
ity." 17 Critics were concerned that reversing convictions based on
technical errors would undermine the public confidence in the judicial
system. 18 Consequently, there was pressure for harmless error
legislation.
In 1919 Congress adopted a federal harmless error statute, which
served as the model for most state legislation. 19 As a result, a trial error
does not automatically call for a reversal of a criminal conviction. In-
stead, the conviction will be upheld if the appellate court concludes that
the error had no impact on the conviction. 20 The reviewing courts
weigh the effect of the error on the jury's probable evaluation of defend-
ant's culpability. 2 1 The federal statute was generally interpreted as ap-
plying only to nonconstitutional errors.2 2 A nonconstitutional error
involves any rule violation. 23 All federal constitutional errors were still
subject to automatic reversal because of the conclusive presumption of
prejudice when a criminal defendant was deprived of a constitutional
right.2 4 However, some state appellate courts applied their state harm-
less error statutes to both constitutional and nonconstitutional state
rights.
25
This inconsistent application of nonconstitutional harmless error
rules led to the advent of the constitutional harmless error doctrine. In
1963, in Fahy v. Connecticut,2 6 the Supreme Court declined to determine
RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 8, 11-13 (1970); 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
§ 21 (3d ed. 1940).
15. In Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Supreme Court held that the
illegal admission of defendant's statement is reversible error "since the prosecution can-
not on one hand offer evidence to prove guilt ... and on the other hand for the purpose of
avoiding consequences of the error ... be heard to assert that the matter offered as a
confession was not prejudicial because it did not tend to prove guilt." Id. at 541.
16. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 14, at 370-73 n.3.
17. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal justice by Exercise of
Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222 (1925), quoted in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 759 (1946). See TRAYNOR, supra note 14, at 14-15 n.3 ("There had to be an end to
battles of bright or dull wits in the courtroom on witless technicalities.").
18. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (recognizing the harmless error
doctrine "promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying
fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.")
Id. at 681. Cf. TRAYNOR, supra note 14, at 50 ("Reversal for error, regardless of its effect
on the judgement, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public
to ridicule it.").
19. Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111
(1988). See supra note 5.
20. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 996.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Nonconstitutional harmless errors include: joinder, venue, discovery, jury selec-
tion and any other violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 996.
24. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).
25. By 1967, all fifty states had adopted harmless error rules by statute. See Chapman
v. California, 286 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
26. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
19921
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whether the erroneous admission of evidence obtained by an illegal
search and seizure, a constitutional error, can ever be subject to harm-
less error under the federal standard. 2 7 Assuming that the rule applied,
the majority reversed the conviction, holding that it was not harmless
error for the trial judge to admit the evidence. 28 The dissenters in Fahy
rejected the majority's approach. They saw no reason why the harmless
error rule should not apply to constitutional errors as well as nonconsti-
tutional errors.29 This dissent ultimately prevailed and became the law
in the landmark case of Chapman.
B. The Chapman Case
Four years after Fahy, the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California,
3 0
held that a conviction can be upheld despite a violation of a criminal
defendant's constitutional right under the theory of constitutional harm-
less error.3 1 In Chapman, the prosecutor persistently commented on the
defendant's failure to testify. 32 Justice Black, writing for the majority,
rationalized that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless. 33 However,
there may be some constitutional errors that in the setting of a particular
case are "so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with
the federal constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring automatic
reversal of the conviction."' 34 The majority concluded that the prosecu-
tor's continued comments concerning a defendant's silence were subject
to harmless error analysis.
35
The Court noted that simply because the rule of automatic reversal
had not been applied to constitutional errors in the past, that did not
mean a constitutional error could never be harmless. 36 Justice Black ex-
plained that, "harmless error rules serve a useful purpose since they
block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little
likelihood of having affected the result of the trial."'3 7 The Court held
27. Id. at 86. The constitutional violation was a breach of Mapp v. Ohio 1 367 U.S.
643 (1948).
28. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 87 (1963).
29. Id. at 92-95 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
31. Id; See Skoglind, Harmless Constitutional Error: An Analysis of Its Current Application,
33 BAYLOR L. REV. 961 (1981) [hereinafter Skoglind] (examining commentators' theories
attempting to explain Chapman's application of the harmless error doctrine).
32. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Court held that a prosecutor's or
judge's comment on the defendant's failure to testify overly burdens the defendant's right
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is constitutional
error. See CAL. CoNsT. art. VI § 4.5 (forbids reversal unless the error complained of has
resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice).
33. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8 citing as examples Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confessions), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(denial of right to counsel), Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1926) (biased judge).
34. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
35. Id. at 24.
36. Id. at 21-22 (Court noted that harmless error statutes do not distinguish between
federal constitutional and nonconstitutional errors).
37. Id. at 22.
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that a federal constitutional error can be harmless, but that the prosecu-
tion carries the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." s3 8 This
federal constitutional standard remains more stringent than the typical
state rule.n
9
The Chapman decision provides a two-step analysis for dealing with
a constitutionally based error. First, the reviewing court must decide
whether the constitutional error falls within the types of violations sub-
ject to harmless error analysis.4 0 Second, assuming the harmless error
rule is appropriate, the court must consider whether, beyond a reason-
able doubt, the error had no impact on the verdict.
4 1
It is important to recognize that the nonconstitutional harmless er-
ror test applies to both evidentiary and "structural errors," but the con-
stitutional harmless error rule applies only to those errors which
implicate the jury's decision. Structural errors are those that cannot be
compared to other evidence presented at trial in order to determine
whether they were harmless. Under the constitutional harmless error
doctrine, structural errors still result in automatic reversal. 42 This dis-
tinction reflects the Court's view that a constitutional error implicates
the defendant's right to a fair proceeding more significantly than other
trial errors.43 The Supreme Court has increasingly utilized the constitu-
tional harmless error doctrine,4 4 and the Rehnquist Court recently de-
clared that the rule presumptively applies to virtually all types of federal
constitutional errors.
45
38. Id. at 24. There are numerous articles on Chapman v. California, note 3. See, e.g.,
Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error - A Process in Need of a Rationale,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1976) [hereinafter Field]. See also supra note 3.
39. The typical state constitutional rule allowed an appellate court to uphold a convic-
tion if the court could find that, despite the constitutional error, there was "overwhelming
evidence" to support the conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23. See Pondolfi
supra note 14, at 619.
40. Scoville, supra note 3, at 743.
41. For example, even if the jury heard evidence that was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure, the appellate court
will affirm the conviction if the evidence did not contribute to the verdict. Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970). For an explanation of the "affect" test or the "over-
whelming evidence" test of Chapman see Field supra note 38; Skoglind supra note 31, at
961.
42. See supra note 33. See also Kotteakos V. United States, 328 U.S. at 764-65.
43. Scoville supra note 3 at 744-45 (1987).
44. Tom Stacey & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 79 (1988) [hereinafter Stacey & Dayton] (an examination of the expansion of consti-
tutional harmless error). For discussion of the widespread use of constitutional harmless
error during the Burger Court, see Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal
Justice, 60 GEo. L.J. 249 (1971).
45. In Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1986), the Court, in holding an erroneous
malice instruction subject to harmless error analysis, explained:
while there are some errors to which Chapman does not apply, they are the excep-
tion and not the rule .... [I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that
may have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis. /
1992]
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C. Post-Chapman
Commentators and lower courts have criticized Chapman for provid-
ing little guidance and clouding the issue of which constitutional errors
are subject to the harmless error rule, rather then to a rule of automatic
reversal. 4 6 While Chapman failed to enunciate a clear standard to deter-
mine which errors fall into the harmless error category, the opinion ten-
uously established which types of errors would not be subject to the
rule. There are two types of constitutional errors that are not subject to
harmless error analysis. First, there are those errors which are so funda-
mental to the constitutional right to a fair trial that they mandate auto-
matic reversal.4 7 Second, there are those errors the effect of which on
the jury is so uncertain that the appellate court is unable to determine
whether the error is harmless. Consequently, the application of the out-
come-determinative test is impossible.
48
In an attempt to clarify which type of errors would not be subject to
the harmless error analysis, the Court in Chapman cited to three cases:
Payne v. Arkansas, which involved a coerced confession,4 9 Gideon v. Wain-
wright, which involved the denial of the right to counsel at trial50 and
Tumey v. Ohio, a case which concerned a judge with a financial stake in
the outcome.5 l The denial of the right to counsel and of the right to an
impartial judge can be viewed as rendering "a trial fundamentally un-
fair. ' ' 52 In the case of a coerced confession, it was assumed that a re-
viewing court would not be able to determine with certainty that such an
error was nonprejudicial.
53
Since Chapman, the Court has continually expanded the application
of the harmless error doctrine to a range of constitutional evidentiary
related errors, but it has not offered guidance in determining which er-
rors apply to the rule.54 Conversely, the Court has found that the harm-
less error rule applies to the admission of evidence obtained in violation
46. See, e.g., Mause supra note 6 at 527-33; Skoglind supra note 31. Cf. Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Rather than creating a broad, new pre-
sumption in favor of harmless error analysis ... Chapman merely rejected the notion that
such analysis was always impermissible and articulated a rigorous standard for determin-
ing whether a presumptively prejudicial error could, in fact, be deemed harmless.").
47. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. provides in pertinent part: "[n]o person.., shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ......
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "[n]o state ... shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ...."
48. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13,
at 1001.
49. 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
50. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
51. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
52. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986).
53. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. at 568 (When a "coerced confession constitutes a part
of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict is returned, no one can say what
credit and weight the jury gave to the confession.").
54. See generally Stacey & Dayton supra note 44, at 712.
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of the Fourth 55 and Sixth Amendments. 56 The right to cross-examine
an adverse witness, 57 violation of the Bruton rule58 (prohibiting use of a
nontestifying codefendant's confessions), 5 9 the failure to instruct the
jury on the presumption of innocence 60 and the defendant's right to be
present at all stages of the trial6 ' have been translated by the Court as
subject to the harmless error rule. More recently, the erroneous exclu-
sion of defendant's testimony regarding circumstances of his confes-
sion,6 2 and a jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive
presumption were found to violate the defendant's right to a fair trial.
6 3
On the other hand, the Court has frequently reiterated the Brain 64 deci-
sion, which held that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession
automatically mandates reversal of the conviction.6 5 In these cases, the
Court apparently viewed coerced confessions as having such an impact
on the jury as to make it impossible to establish harmlessness. Further-
more, the Court abhors 66 the use of involuntary confessions because it
conflicts with the societal belief that "the police must obey the law while
enforcing the law."' 67 The use of an erroneously admitted confession
55. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (admission into evidence of gun ob-
tained in illegal search and seizure was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt).
56. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (denial of counsel at a preliminary hear-
ing in violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel was subject to the harmless error
rule); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969) (Sixth Amendment right to confronta-
tion by accuser was subject to the harmless error rule).
57. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
58. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
59. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); see also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223 (1973).
60. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
61. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983).
62. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
63. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989).
64. In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the defendant was arrested for
murder committed on the high seas and was brought into the police detective's office
where he was interrogated. He was tricked into an inculpatory statement when the detec-
tive told Bram that another sailor said that he saw Brain commit the murder. Brain re-
plied: "[hie could not see me from there." Id. at 562. The detective told Brain if he had
an accomplice, he should say so and not carry the entire blame on "[his] own shoulders."
Id. at 539. Bram then said that Brown was the murderer. Id. The majority, considering
the totality of the circumstances, held that Bram's statements were involuntary. Id. at 562-
64. The Court quoted a criminal law treatise: "a confession, in order to be admissible,
must be free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or vio-
lence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion
of any improper influence." Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 William 0. Russell, RussEu. ON
CRITMES 478 (6th ed. 1896)).
65. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,
376 (1964) (defendant's confession, which occurred while he was under drugs in a hospital
emergency room, violated due process); Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518 (1963)
(defendant's written confession was obtained by substantial coercion and its admission
constituted reversable error); Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963) (defendant may
have made an involuntary confession when threatened that her financial aid would be dis-
continued); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (defendant was incompetent at
the time he confessed); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (deceptive techniques
were the cause of a coerced confession); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945)
(overturning conviction due to introduction of a coerced confession at trial).
66. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
67. Id.
1992]
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has been characterized as an "impermissible doctrine."'68
D. Involuntary Confessions
Supreme Court decisions since Chapman have reaffirmed Payne and
held that the admission of an involuntary confession requires automatic
reversal, 69 even though it relates to an evidentiary question. The Court
declared that even though there may be sufficient evidence apart from
the confession to support the conviction, admission of a coerced confes-
sion into evidence contaminates the judgment because it violates due
process70 and provides a "false foundation for any conviction." '7 1
Payne was reaffirmed 72 after Chapman, but has also been judicially
undermined. In Milton v. Wainwright,73 the Court applied the harmless
error rule to the admission of a confession obtained in violation of the
defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. A confession obtained
through a violation of the Sixth Amendment may have a similar impact
on a jury's evaluation of the defendant's guilt as a coerced confession, 74
and though it may have a higher likelihood of being false, the Court still
applies the harmless error rule.
The harmless error rule's applicability to the erroneous confession
cases was described as "inherently unreliable" for several reasons. 75
First, due to the broad standards used to determine whether a confes-
sion is coerced, 76 many confessions that are borderline involuntary
could be the procedural error needed to reverse the defendant's convic-
tion. In substance, a confession is voluntary if it is the product of "an
essentially free and unconstrained choice" 7 7 by the party making the
statement. The voluntariness of a confession is determined by the total-
ity of all the surrounding circumstances, 78 including the characteristics
of the suspect and the details of the interrogation. 7 9 In theory, it seems
the voluntariness requirement could be stretched to include almost all
68. Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. at 537.
69. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. at 561.
70. Id. at 562. In Payne, the defendant, a "mentally dull" nineteen year old negro was
arrested without warrant, denied his right to a hearing before the magistrate, not advised
to remain silent or on his right to counsel, held incommunicado for three days, denied
food for long periods and told by police chief that thirty people were going to attack him
outside.
71. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. at 568 (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 191
(1953)).
72. Nincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401 (1978) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. at 206) ("the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional
inquisition").
73. 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
74. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 1005.
75. Id.
76. Lorey J. Ayling, Comment, Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of Legal
Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1121 (proposing that a false confes-
sion includes a broad range of self-incriminating behavior).
77. Id. at 1123 n.4 (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).




confessions that are the result of arrest or interrogation."0 In reality,
the doctrine has been used to exclude from evidence two types of con-
fessions: confessions obtained under prolonged and inherently coercive
circumstances8 1 and confessions produced by the suspect's weakness.
8 2
Second, coerced confession cases can be hypothesized where they
would have no impact on the jury's evaluation of the defendant's culpa-
bility.8 3 Therefore, the justification for exclusion of coerced confessions
from harmless error analysis seems dependent on the fear of police mis-
behavior,8 4 concern for the "judicial proceedings as a whole"8 5 and be-
lief in the fundamental principle that our system of criminal justice is
"an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system .... *"86 Finally, the
doctrine's applicability has confused lower courts because of the diverse
and inconsistent application of the rule to certain constitutional er-
rors.8 7 Most lower courts have adhered to the rule of automatic reversal
for coerced confessions, but some have held the erroneous admission of
involuntary confessions to be harmless error. 8 Lower courts have also
80. Ayling, supra note 76, at 1123 nA (citing CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, § 147 (3rd ed. 1984)).
81. Ayling, supra note 76, at 1123 n.4 (citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944) (defendant confessed after he was deprived of sleep, food and held incommuni-
cado); Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (confession obtained after defendant
had been held incommunicado for sixteen hours); see also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534 (1961) (police officer threatened to bring in defendant's wife if defendant did not
confess).
82. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (defendant who had a bullet wound con-
fessed in a hospital emergency room); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (defendant
confessed while in great pain and on drugs in the hospital emergency room).
83. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, at 1005.
84. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 319 (1959) (defendant finally confessed, after
repeatedly refusing to answer without counsel, when police initiated the help by his friend
to invoke sympathy); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confessions ob-
tained after brutal beatings).
85. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 50 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
87. Although most courts have held that involuntary confessions are subject to an
automatic reversal, other courts have applied the Chapman rule. See Harrison v. Owen, 682
F.2d 138, 140-42 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Murphy, 763 F.2d 202, 208-10 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986). These cases also applied Milton v. Wainwright,
407 U.S. 371 (1972), a Supreme Court case subsequent to Chapman, in which the defend-
ant contended that one of his four confessions was involuntary. The Court held that any
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury was presented with other
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 372.
88. The federal circuit court cases include: Moore v. Follette, 425 F.2d 925, 928 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 966 (1970) (admission of an improperly obtained confes-
sion can be considered harmless); Meade v. Cox, 438 F.2d 323, 325 (4th Cir. 1971) (de-
spite a dispute about the voluntariness of the statement, court found its admission to be
harmless error); Harrison v. Owen, 682 F.2d 138, 142 (7th Cir. 1982) (admission of invol-
untary confession prompted by police telling the defendant that consideration would be
given to defendant was held to be harmless error); United States v. Carter, 804 F.2d 487,
489-90 (8th Cir. 1986) (police detective misled defendant into thinking he was being ques-
tioned for an assault, not a murder, which induced an involuntary confession whose ad-
mission into evidence was harmless error).
State court cases include: State v. Castaneda 724 P.2d 1, 6 (1986) (admission of de-
fendant's statement concerning the location of the victim's body induced by police deceit,
if coerced was harmless error); People v. Gibson, 440 N.E.2d 339, 343-44 (1982) (im-
proper admission of defendant's incriminating statements to his prison mate, a govern-
ment informant, were, in light of other testimony, harmless error); People v. Ferkins, 497
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
applied the harmless error doctrine to a defendant's statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda.
8 9
After expanding the categories of errors subject to harmless error
analysis, the Supreme Court finally clarified the fate of the admission of
an involuntary confession. Coerced confessions have been excluded for
ninety years from scrutiny under the harmless error rule, but lower
court confusion and Rehnquist's perseverance 90 prompted the Supreme
Court to take a closer look at this issue. Conflicting opinions among
state and federal courts over whether coerced confessions should be
subject to harmless error analysis gave rise to the Supreme Court'9 grant
of certiorari in the instant case, Arizona v. Fulminante.9 1
III. ARIZONA V. FULMINANTE
A. Facts
On September 14, 1982, Oreste C. Fulminante telephoned the po-
lice to report his 11-year-old stepdaughter, Jeneane Hunt, missing.
Jeneane's body was discovered in the desert two days later. She had
been shot in the head at close range with a large-caliber weapon and had
a ligature tied around her neck that could have been used to choke
her.9 2 Due to inconsistencies in Fulminante's statements to the police
concerning his stepdaughter's disappearance, Fulminante became a sus-
pect injeneane's murder.9 3 Since no charges were filed, Fulminante left
Arizona. Later, Fulminante was convicted of an unrelated federal crime
and imprisoned in a federal correctional facility in New York. While he
was imprisoned, Fulminante cultivated a friendship with Anthony
Sarivola ("Sarivola"), a former member of an organized crime family,
who was serving a 60-day sentence for extortion. Sarivola, an informant
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was masquerading as a member
of an organized crime family. 9 4 After hearing that Fulminante was sus-
pected of murdering a child in Arizona, Sarivola discussed the rumor
with Fulminante. Fulminante initially denied any connection to the mur-
N.Y.S.2d 159, 161-62 (1986) (error in the admission of involuntary statements was harm-
less due to the cumulative impact of the statements).
89. The Miranda protections govern custodial interrogations, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). See Amicus Curiae United States Brief for Petitioner at 26, Arizona v.
Fulminante, 111 U.S. 1246 (1991) (No. 89-839); see generally Stacey & Dayton supra note
44.
90. When Rehnquist served as a law clerk forJustice RobertJackson in 1952, Rehn-
quist wrote a memorandum concerning a coerced confession case, Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156 (1953). He argued against the dominant view (that convictions which may be
based on coerced confessions cannot be sustained on appeal) alleging that "[t]he ivory
towers ofjurisprudence... [have] weakened local law enforcement .... Let's hope it has
come to an end." Jackson did not succumb to Rehnquist's argument, but Jackson did
uphold the convictions on different grounds. Tony Mauro, How Television Captured the
Court, Legal Times, April 8, 1991, at 6-7 (quoting Rehnquist's memorandum to RobertJack-
son in Jackson's papers at the Library of Congress).
91. Arizona v. Fulminante, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).





der. Sarivola told his FBI contact, Agent Ticano, about the rumor, and
Ticano asked Sarivola to try to discern more about it.9 5 Sarivola then
spoke with Fulminante again, who was "starting to get some rough treat-
ment from the guys"'9 6 because of the rumor. Sarivola promised Fulmi-
nante protection from the other inmates, "but told him, 'You have to tell
me about it,' you know. I mean, in other words, 'For me give you any
help.' -97 At that time Fulminante then admitted to Sarivola he had sex-
ually assaulted and choked Jeneane, forced her to beg for her life, and
then killed her.98 Sarivola was released from prison in November of
1983 and Fulminante was discharged six months later.99 After Fulmi-
nante's release, Sarivola and his fiancee, Donna, met Fulminante at a bus
terminal. Fulminante told Donna he could not return to Arizona be-
cause he had killed a little girl there. Fulminante then admitted to
Donna he had sexually assaulted and choked Jeneane, and then forced
her to beg for her life. 100
Before and during trial, Fulminante made motions to suppress his
confessions, claiming they were involuntary. The trial court denied the
motion and both confessions were admitted at trial. The jury found
Fulminante guilty and sentenced him to death. 10 1
Fulminante appealed, claiming the admission of his two confessions
violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution.10 2 The Arizona Supreme
Court initially determined that Fulminante's confession to Sarivola was
coerced, but that its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because of the overwhelming evidence against Fulminante. 10 3 Fulmi-
nante's second confession to Donna was not "fruit of a poisonous
tree," ' 0 4 which the court ruled admissible. Fulminante moved for a mo-
tion of reconsideration, which the court granted.
In its supplemental opinion, the majority held, over one dissent,
that precedent precluded application of the harmless error doctrine to
the erroneous admission of a coerced confession.' 0 5 The court held
that "until and unless the Supreme Court changes the law, we must or-
der [the] defendant retried without the use of the coerced
95. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 5, Arizona v. Fulminante, II1 S. Ct. 1246 (No.
89-839).
96. 111 S. Ct. at 1250 (quoting Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 83, Arizona v.




100. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 6, Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (No.
89-839).
101. 111 S. Ct. at 1250-51.
102. State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 608 (Ariz. 1988).
103. Id. at 610-11.
104. The court held that Fulminante's second confession was not tainted by the first
confession to Sarivola based on the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine as espoused in
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). This portion of the Arizona Supreme
Court's holding was not challenged by the Supreme Court. 111 S. Ct. at 1251 n.l.
105. 778 P.2d at 627.
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confession." 10 6
B. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinions
In a fragmented majority opinion written in part by Justice White
and in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that
Fulminante's confession to Anthony Sarivola was coerced, 10 7 that the
harmless error rule applied to the erroneous admission of a coerced
confession, 10 8 but that the admission of Fulminante's confession was
not harmless. 10 9
The first issue the Court addressed was whether the Arizona
Supreme Court erred in holding Fulminante's confession involun-
tary. 110 In determining the question of the voluntariness, the Court,
speaking through Justice White, made an independent determination"'
by applying the totality of the surrounding circumstances test.1 12 The
White majority held that there was a credible threat of violence unless
Fulminante confessed, and a credible threat suffices for a finding of a
coerced confession. The Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's
supplemental finding that the confession was involuntary. Four Justices
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissenting on this issue.
The next issue the Court addressed was whether the admission of a
coerced confession at trial is subject to harmless error analysis. 1 3 This
portion of the majority opinion, written by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, ex-
plained that the "common thread" connecting errors subject to harm-
less error analysis was that they all involved a "trial error."'1 14 This type
of error, which occurs during the presentation of the case to the jury,
may be assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to
determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.1 5 Rehnquist distinguished trial errors from "structural defects"
in the trial mechanism, the latter not subject to harmless error
analysis. 16
The Rehnquist majority concluded that the erroneous admission of
an involuntary confession is a trial error, similar in kind and degree to
other types of erroneously admitted evidence. 1 7 Thus, a coerced con-
fession can be considered harmless error when there is enough addi-
106. Id.
107. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 (1991) (White, J.).
108. Id. at 1266 (Rehnquist, J.).
109. Id. at 1258 (White, J.).
110. Id. at 1251.
111. Id. at 1252. See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1940).
112. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1251.
113. Id. at 1263-66.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1264.
116. Id. at 1264-65. See also infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
117. 111 S. Ct. at 1265.
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tional evidence to justify a guilty verdict.11 8 The majority imposed a
stringent standard for an appellate court to determine whether an error
was harmless: the error must be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 1 19 Justice White, joined by four other justices, dissented on this
issue.
The final issue the Court addressed was whether the State had met
its burden of demonstrating that the admission of the confession to
Sarivola did not contribute to Fulminante's conviction. 12 0 The majority
on this third issue, again written byJustice White, explained that confes-
sions profoundly impact the jury12 1 and provided three reasons why this
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, White ex-
plained both confessions were required for a successful prosecution.
12 2
Second, the jury's assessment of the second confession, to Donna, could
have been dependent on the first involuntary confession to Sarivola.
12 3
Finally, the admission of the first confession led to the admission of
other evidence prejudicial to Fulminante.
124
2. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy, accepting the majority's finding that the confes-
sion was coerced, wrote a separate concurrence "[in the interests of
providing a clear mandate to the Arizona Supreme Court."'125 He
agreed that the admission of involuntary confessions should be subject
to harmless error analysis, but emphasized that a court must appreciate
the "indelible impact a full confession may have on the trier offact."'
12 6
3. Dissenting Opinions
Justice White strongly dissented on the second issue concerning the
application of the harmless error rule to coerced confessions. Justice
White, actually reading a bitter dissent from the bench, 127 accused the
majority of abandoning "one of the fundamental tenets of our criminal
justice system"'128 by not automatically reversing a conviction once an
involuntary confession is admitted. He explained that the severity of a
coerced confession required that improper admission of such evidence
should never be subject to harmless error. Justice White cited numer-
ous authorities accusing the majority of overturning a "vast body of pre-
cedent."1 2 9 Moreover, White called the majority's distinction between
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1257.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1258.
123. Id. at 1258-59.
124. Id. at 1259-60.
125. Id. at 1267.
126. Id. at 1266.
127. See David G. Savage, High Court Allows Forced Confessions in Criminal Trials, L.A.
Timas, Mar. 27, 1991, at Al.
128. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1254.
129. Id.
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trial error and structural defects in the trial mechanism
"meaningless." 1 3 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority's first finding
that the confession was coerced. He agreed with the trial court's finding
that there was no evidence to indicate Fulminante confessed because of
fear.' 3 ' Justice Rehnquist also dissented from the majority's final con-
clusion that the error was not harmless. He adhered to the Arizona
Supreme Court's initial finding that, in light of the other overwhelming




The result in Fulminante is an expansion of an already widening use
of the constitutional harmless error doctrine, which strikes a balance be-
tween the defendant's interest in a fair trial and society's interest injudi-
cial precision and economy. 13 3 The Supreme Court has increasingly
extended the application of the constitutional harmless error rule since
its inception in 1967.134 There is no clear basis for the outrages against
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. Critics claim the Court has
abandoned the constitutional requirement of due process, 13 5 however,
the premise of these criticisms is distorted. The holding is a step to-
wards preventing defendants from escaping conviction because of harm-
less constitutional errors. In this way, the decision balances society's
interest in convicting the guilty and an innocent person's interest in
avoiding an unjust conviction.
The key distinction between the majority and the dissent is the dif-
ference in their interpretations of Chapman. Chapman is the foundation
upon which all law concerning the harmless error doctrine is built.
White, in his dissent, used Chapman's citation to Payne in a footnote as an
example of the blanket exclusion of coerced confessions from harmless
error analysis. Yet, the majority held that it is not clear that Payne stood
for such a premise.' 3 6 The majority explained not all constitutional trial
errors trigger automatic reversal 13 7 and Chapman, in dictum, merely
made a historical reference to Payne in a footnote.' 3 8 Payne did not re-
ject applying the harmless error analysis to coerced confessions, but re-
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1262.
132. Id. at 1266.
133. See generally Stacey & Dayton supra note 44 (an examination of the expansion of the
constitutional harmless error doctrine).
134. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See authorities cited supra note 5.
135. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1253 (WhiteJ., dissenting); see also Martin
Tolchin, Defense Lawyers Assail Court Ruling on Coerced Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991,
at B10; Paul D. Kamenar, Restore Balance of Society's Rights, USA TODAY, April 2, 1991, at
Al2.
136. 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
137. Id. (citing Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963)).




jected a different, more lenient rule than the harmless error doctrine.13 9
Justice White's dissent discredits the Rehnquist majority's analogy
between trial errors and structural defects in the trial mechanism. By
claiming the majority makes a "meaningless dichotomy,"' 140 the dissent
overlooks the rationale. The majority cited a string of cases14 1 that ap-
ply the harmless error rule to constitutional errors. Upon a thorough
examination of all the cases, the majority concluded that each case may
be assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to deter-
mine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The "common thread" in these cases is that they each involved a "trial
error."1 4 2 This is distinct from a "structural defect."1 43 A "trial er-
ror's" impact on the jury may be compared to and weighed against the
other evidence presented at trial in order to determine whether it is
harmless. On the other hand, a "structural defect" is an error in the
engineering of the trial that cannot be cured by other evidence. While
the total deprivation of the right to counsel
144 and an impartial judge14 5
are structural defects in the trial mechanism and oppose analysis by the
harmless error rule, the admission of an involuntary confession is not of
the same caliber since the weight given it by the jury can be compared to
other evidence admitted to determine its relative impact on the jury's
verdict. 146
Justice White's dissent neglects changes in the law that could allow
the harmless error doctrine to apply to coerced confessions.' 4 7 Some
scholars have argued that the historic rationales for excluding coerced
confessions from harmless error analysis no longer exist due to the re-
cent widespread use of the constitutional harmless error doctrine.
148
The dissent makes a blanket assumption that any type of coerced confes-
sion is per se harmful and therefore reversible.' 4 9 The cases the dissent
cites include only three that held the admission of a coerced confession
139. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
140. 111 S. Ct. at 1254 (White, J., dissenting).
141. Harmless error rules have been applied to a breadth of errors in state and federal
proceedings. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct 1441 (1990) (unconstitutionally
broad sentencing jury instructions); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (erroneous
conclusive presumption in jury instruction); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988)
(admission of evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Pope v.
Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-504 (1987) (jury instruction, which misstated an element of the
offense); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (erroneous rebuttal presumption injury in-
struction); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983) (defendant's right to be present at trial);
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (improper comment on defendant's silence
at trial).
142. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265.
143. Id.
144. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
145. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
146. Id.
147. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 627 (Ariz. 1989) (Cameron, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting the changes in the law now make it possible for the harmless error doc-
trine to apply to coerced but reliable confessions); see also James D. Cameron & Jones
Osborne, When Harmless Error Isn't Harmless, 1971 LAw & Soc. ORD. 24, 29-30 (1971).
148. Stacey & Dayton supra note 44 at 712 and accompanying text.
149. Id.
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could not be considered harmless error.1 50 In all three cases, the con-
fessions were obtained under extreme coercive pressure, where the de-
fendant was weakened and put through an intensive interrogation
process by public authorities. 15 1 However, the facts of the confession
should not be conclusive since the rationale is based on the amount of
other evidence presented at trial.
The harmless error doctrine has been applied to a growing number
of evidentiary errors. 15 2 In Milton v. Wainwright,153 the Court applied
the harmless error rule to a confession by the defendant to a police of-
ficer posing as a fellow inmate in the same cell as the defendant. The
defendant had also made three other full confessions. The Court rea-
soned that in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's
guilt, assuming that the challenged testimony was improperly admitted,
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.154 In Delaware v. Van Ar-
sdall,155 the Court held that the denial of the defendant's opportunity to
impeach a witness for bias was subject to harmless error analysis.
Justice White's dissent makes a strong point concerning the impact
of involuntary confessions. The majority acknowledged the damaging
impact of a coerced confession on the defendant and enunciated a strin-
gent standard to determine the contribution of the confession to the
conviction. 15 6 The burden is on the prosecutor to prove that the admis-
sion of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 57 The
Fulminante decision demonstrates the difficulty in proving the harmless-
ness of a coerced confession. This is due to the majority's rejection of
the state's harmless error argument, despite Fulminante's second in-
criminating confession.
The dissent justifies precluding coerced confessions from harmless
error analysis in light of brutal methods used to extract confessions.
These tactics did not exist in Fulminante. Assuming there had been abu-
sive tactics by the interrogators, the due process clause does not serve as
an instrument to reform the behavior of state officials. 158 Nor does the
Fulminante decision promote such official misbehavior; rather, the rule
incorporating the deterrent policy as the constitutional ban on involun-
150. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964);
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
151. In Payne, a "mentally dull" young defendant went through a brutal police interro-
gation process. See supra note 70. In Jackson, the defendant, who was shot twice, made
incriminating statements to a police officer while the defendant was in the emergency
room and drugged on demerol, an analgesic sedative. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 368. In Mincey,
the defendant was in unbearable pain and almost comatose, when he made an incriminat-
ing statement after an interrogation. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 385.
152. See Stacey & Dayton supra note 44.
153. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
154. Id. at 372.
155. Delaware v. Van ArsdaIl, 475 U.S. 673 (1986). Violations of defendant's right to
prohibit the use ofa nontestifying codefendant's confession at trial as protected by Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), are also subject to harmless error analysis.
156. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1266.
157. Id.
158. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 438 (1945) (Stone, CJ., dissenting).
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tary confessions is left in force by the decision. Involuntary confessions
will continue to be subject to the voluntariness doctrine in order to de-
termine their admissibility.159 The opinion will not be a catalyst for cor-
rupt police interrogation.
160
The dissent underrates Fulminante's criminal justice policy. The
overriding purpose of a criminal trial is to determine the defendant's
guilt or innocence.' 6 1 The harmless error doctrine is not a shield to
protect the defendant from a fair prosecution. 162 This is why the
Supreme Court in Chapman held that a constitutional error does not au-
tomatically trigger reversal.' 63 This harmless error test covers a
breadth of errors, and the majority in Fulminante saw no reason to pre-
clude its extension to coerced confessions. 164 In criminal procedure,
the problem has been described as one of balancing conflicting interests
and of securing as many interests as possible.' 65 By attempting to pro-
mote this goal, the Court has stressed that the defendant is entitled to a
"fair trial, not a perfect one."' 66 The harmless error doctrine recog-
nizes that the underlying purpose of criminal justice is to concentrate on
the equity of the trial rather than on a practically inevitable trial error in
order to promote public respect for the criminal system.
16 7
In the future, it seems there will be fewer trial errors that the de-
fendant may use to escape a conviction because of the growing use of
the harmless error doctrine. 16 8 The distinguishing feature between er-
rors subject to the harmless error analysis and those that are excluded
will be whether the court finds an error to be a trial error occurring
during the course of the proceeding, or a structural defect in the trial
mechanism. To determine which category the error falls into, reviewing
courts will examine whether the error is such that its contribution to the
conviction can be qualitatively assessed in light of other admitted evi-
dence in order to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, or whether the error is a fault in the engineering of
the trial whose impact upon the jury cannot be evaluated. When a court
159. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
160. Bruce Fein, Crying Wolf on Coerced-Confession Cases, N.J. LAwJ., April 18, 1991, at 18
(Commentary).
161. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975).
162. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 94 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. United
States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (it is the reviewing court's duty to ignore harmless
errors).
163. Chapman y. California, 386 U.S. at 22-23. See also Pendolti supra note 14, at 618-
19.
164. Arizona v. Fulminate, 111 S. Ct. at 1264.
165. Roscoe Pound, The Future of 1he Criminal Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1921)
provides:
(Tihe social interest in the general security and the social interest in the individ-
ual life continually come into conflict and in criminal law, as everywhere else in
law, the problem is one of... balancing conflicting interests and of securing as
many as may be and as completely as may be with the least sacrifice ....
166. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968); United States v. Hastings, 461
U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983).
167. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); see TRAYNOR, supra note 14, at 50.
168. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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finds a trial defect, as it did in Fulminante, the error will be subject to
harmless error analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the Court faithfully adheres to this distinction between
trial errors and structural defects is unpredictable. Will the Court pre-
serve the categories it has created and continually conclude that no er-
rors will be found to be harmless unless they are cured by other
evidence? Will lack of adequate counsel remain an error in the trial
engineering or will the Court maintain the category by changing the law
and creating more stringent rules for competent counsel? A consistent
application of the doctrine will depend on the Court's adherence to the
standard Rehnquist pronounced in this opinion.
Wherever one falls on the ideological spectrum, the application of
the harmless error rule to coerced confessions is no threat to civil liber-
ties since the constitutional ban on coerced confessions is sustained.
The Supreme Court has stated it is not willing to "discredit constitu-
tional doctrines for the protection of the innocent by making them mere
technical loopholes for the escape of the guilty."1 69 A strong impetus
behind the harmless error doctrine is a balancing of the defendant's in-
terest in a fair trial against the societal interest in judicial economy and
precision.' 70 The expanding use of the harmless error doctrine will
help to promote this goal and enhance judicial precision.
Fulminante has not dislodged a defendant's right to due process.
While the enmity surrounding the opinion may cause critics to refuse to
acknowledge that Fulminante has a relatively minor effect on criminal jus-
tice, 17 1 it remains to be seen how steadfastly the Court will adhere to
their conviction.
Karina Pergament
169. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196-97 (1953), overruled by Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 398 (1964).
170. See United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (A balance needs to be
struck "between the prosecutor on the one hand, and the interest in the prompt adminis-
tration ofjustice and the interests of the victims on the other.").
171. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991, at B10 (Late Edition).
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